Reckless Driving[1]
Dale G. Larrimore
Larrimore & Farnish, LLP – Philadelphia, PA
Larrimore & Farnish, LLP – Philadelphia, PA
§ 3736. Reckless driving.
Any person who drives any vehicle in
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of
reckless driving.
The phrase “willful and wanton” as
used in section 3736 of the Vehicle Code, applies when a driver grossly
deviates from ordinary prudence and creates a substantial risk of injury.[2] It conforms to the type of conduct that is
generally known as reckless conduct in the law. Under the Restatement Second of
the Law of Torts:
The actor's conduct is in reckless
disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to
do an act which it is his duty to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts
which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates
an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.[3]
A motorist who exhibits a callous
disregard for the danger created by his or her conduct would be guilty of
reckless driving under this section.[4]
Reckless
conduct is the “intentional acting or failing to act in complete disregard of a
risk of harm to others which is known or should be known to be highly probable
and with a conscious indifference to the consequence .... In other words, it’s
more than mere negligence. It’s acting in such a way that the person acting has
a conscious indifference to the consequences.”[5]
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated that a person is guilty of wanton
misconduct if that person recklessly disregards an existing danger, realizing,
or at least having knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable man to
realize, the existence of the peril for a sufficient period of time to give an
opportunity to take action to avoid the accident.[6]
Driving a vehicle at 70
miles-per-hour around a blind curve demonstrates willful or wanton disregard
for the safety of persons or property, sufficient to support a conviction for
reckless driving.[7] Entering
the opposite lane of travel constitutes reckless driving.[8]
Every licensed driver is aware that driving while under the influence of
alcohol presents a significant and very real danger to others and, under the
appropriate circumstances, evidence of driving under the influence is
outrageous misconduct demonstrating a reckless disregard to the safety of
others sufficient to warrant punitive damages.[9]
Thus,
whether it is termed ‘reckless disregard’ or ‘wanton misconduct,’ the basis of this
liability in tort is premised upon the actor intentionally doing an act
creating a great risk of harm when the actor either (1) knows of the great
risk, but consciously disregards it and proceeds, or (2) had knowledge of facts
that would lead a reasonable man to become aware of this risk in time for the
actor reasonably to avoid the danger.[10]
Our Superior Court has held that a motorist can drive in such a reckless manner
that he must be deemed to have been aware of the fact that he was creating a
substantial risk of causing a motor vehicle collision.[11]
The
violation of multiple provisions of the Vehicle Code can result in a conviction
of reckless driving, even where one violation may not have been sufficient to
demonstrate the requisite degree of wanton disregard for the safety of others. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that the “cumulative conduct” of a
motorist who was speeding, tailgating and erratically changing lanes was
sufficient to demonstrate that he acted in a reckless and grossly negligent
manner.[12]
While
drunk driving is certainly reckless behavior, courts have held that driving
under the influence of an intoxicating substance does not, in and of itself,
establish reckless driving per se; there must be other tangible indicia of
unsafe driving to a degree that creates a substantial risk of injury that is
consciously disregarded.[13]
An intoxicated driver’s flight from an approaching police officer could be
considered reckless driving.[14]
However, it is recognized that there is a level of intoxication that would
render a person so incapable of safe driving that the probability of injury or
death would rise high enough to satisfy the willful and wanton recklessness standard
for a violation of Section 3736 of the Vehicle Code.[15]
There
are two significant effects of reckless conduct by a defendant. First, if the
evidence reveals and the fact finder determines that the defendant acted with
recklessness, then the defendant would be barred from utilizing the affirmative
defense of comparative negligence[16]
at trial.[17] When
willful or wanton misconduct is involved, comparative negligence should not be
applied, as reckless conduct and negligent conduct require different levels of
culpability.[18]
Recklessness is different “in kind” from mere negligence or carelessness; it
cannot be compared with negligence for purposes of apportioning fault under the
Comparative Negligence Act.[19]
For this reason, an averment of recklessness in pleadings is proper on its own,
with or without a claim for punitive damages.
The
second significant effect of reckless conduct is that it exposes the defendant
to a claim of punitive damages. Assessment of punitive damages are proper when
a person's actions are of such an outrageous nature as to demonstrate
intentional, willful, wanton or reckless conduct.[20]
In Feld v. Merriam, the Supreme Court
adopted Section 908(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, under which
punitive damages may be awarded against a defendant who acts with reckless
indifference to the rights of others.[21]
Where a defendant knows, or has reason to know, of facts that create a high
degree of risk of physical harm to another and deliberately proceeds to act or
fails to act in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk than
punitive damages may be awarded.[22]
The
question of whether a person's actions rise to outrageous conduct done with
reckless indifference to the interests of others lies within the sound
discretion of the fact-finder and should not be disturbed by an appellate court
so long as that discretion has not been abused.[23]
[1]
Excerpted
from Larrimore, Dale, Pennsylvania Rules
of the Road, Vol. 13 of West’s Pennsylvania Practice Series, 2016-2017
Edition, Section 6:2. Copyright Thomson Reuters.
[2]
Com. v. Greenberg, 885 A.2d 1025, 1027–28 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2005), cited with approval in Com.
v. Carroll, 936 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
[3]
Restatement
Second of Torts §500, as quoted in Sullivan
v. Wolson, 396 A.2d 1230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
[11]
Com. v. Jeter, 937 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007),
reargument denied January 10, 2008, citing Com.
v. Greenberg, 885 A.2d 1025, 1028–29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
[13]
Com. v. Jeter, 937 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)(citing
Com. v. Mastromatteo, 719 A.2d 1081,
1083 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
[15]
Com. v. Jeter, 937 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007),
citing Com. v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998,
1004 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
[16]
Pennsylvania’s
Comparative Negligence Act is found at 42 Pa.C.S. §7102(a).
[22]SHV Coal, Inc. v. Continental Grain Co., 526 Pa. 489,
494–95, 587 A.2d 702, 704–705 (1991), citing Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 344, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (1963).
